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Abstract:
Fiscal policy is an important government tool for managing the economy, having the ability to affect the total 
amount of output produced - GDP. Changes in the level and composition of government spending, taxation or 
other instruments of fiscal policy have impact on aggregate demand, the pattern of resource allocation, and the 
distribution of income. The article shows the mechanisms through which fiscal policy stabilizes the business 
cycle, and the specific requirements for fiscal policy during recession; the practical problems that may occur in 
implementing an effective fiscal policy are emphasized. Regarding the circumstances of the current financial and 
economic crises, the revival of the fiscal policy as a macroeconomic policy faces high expectations as to what it 
can accomplish. The paper highlights the composition of fiscal stimulus package, and reviews the specific fiscal 
stimulus plans adopted so far by different countries and their objectives. The final section contains an overview 
of the Romanian government response to the current crises, regarding fiscal policy. The conclusion is that 
Romania has conducted an inconsistent and ineffective fiscal policy, which has contributed to macro-economic 
and fiscal imbalances and to an increased fiscal pressure on business. Therefore, a medium-term fiscal 
framework has to be implemented, in order to ensure effectiveness and fiscal sustainability.  
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“The time to act is now”
José Manuel Durão Barroso, 2008
Introduction
Fiscal policy is defined as the deliberate manipulation of government income and 
expenditure, so that to achieve economic and social objectives, and sustain growth 
[article on http://www.buythemap.com]. Fiscal policy is based on the theories of British 
economist John Maynard Keynes. Also known as Keynesian economics, this theory basically 
states that governments can influence macroeconomic productivity levels by increasing or 
decreasing tax levels and public spending. The two main instruments of fiscal policy are 
government spending and taxation. Changes in their level and composition may have impact 
on aggregate demand and the level of economic activity, the pattern of resource allocation, 
and the distribution  of income [article on http://en.wikipedia.org].  Higher government 
spending or a decrease in taxes is an injection of income increasing aggregate demand, whilst 
a decrease in spending or a rising of taxes is an income leakage causing aggregate demand to 
fall. Based on the Keynesian theory, the level of spending in the economy will determine the 
levels of output, i.e. Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and employment, hence the government 
can control these areas of the economy, as it has the power to change aggregate demand, and 
lessen the fluctuations of the business cycle. 
Specific instruments of fiscal policy 
Fiscal policy is an important tool for managing the economy having the ability to affect 
the total amount of output produced, which is GDP. Its ability to affect output by affecting 
aggregate demand makes it a potential tool for economic stabilization. The basics of the fiscal 
mechanism is explained by Weil (2008):  if the economy is in recession, with unused 
productive capacity and unemployed workers, then increases in demand will lead mostly to 
more output without changing the price level;  if the economy is at full employment, by 
contrast, a fiscal expansion will have more effect on prices and less impact on total output.Governments have available various instruments to promote their main objectives, like 
as allocation of resources, stabilisation of the economy, redistribution of income, and 
economic growth. It must be realised that, at times, while the instruments have changed, the 
main governmental objectives have remained the four listed above [Tanzi (2008)].
Government spending  is the most traditional instrument. Both the level of public 
spending and its structure or composition are important and can be considered as separate 
instruments. Taxation is the other obvious instrument, which comprises at least four potential 
and separable instruments, such as the level of taxation, the structure of taxation, tax 
expenditures and tax incentives. According to Tanzi, some countries rely more on levels and 
structures (Scandinavian countries) while others have relied more on tax expenditures (Anglo-
Saxon countries) and on tax incentives (Asian countries and many developing countries) (see 
Tanzi (2008) for an overview of fiscal policy instruments). 
Fiscal policy can work in two general ways to stabilize the business cycle, which are 
automatic stabilizers, and the discretionary fiscal policy. 
Automatic Stabilizers  consist in a “built-in” fiscal mechanism that acts to reduce 
automatically the expansions and contractions of the business cycle [fiscal policy, article on 
http://www.amosweb.com]. This mechanism expands automatically the fiscal policy during 
recessions and contracts it during booms, being one form of countercyclical fiscal policy 
[Weil (2008)]. It depends on the level of aggregate production and income, such that business 
cycle instability is automatically dampened without the need for discretionary policy action. 
Automatic stabilizers work  automatically,  being no need for enacting legislation, 
passing bills, or undertaking any other policy action. These stabilizers are built into the 
structure of the economy and the government sets up the rules and criteria under which taxes 
and transfer payments work. If people meet the criteria, then they pay the taxes or receive the 
transfer payments. The amount of each depends on the number of people meeting the criteria, 
which   is   dependent   on   business   cycle   activity  [fiscal   policy,   article   on 
http://www.amosweb.com].  Automatic stabilizers increase budget deficits during times of 
recessions or decrease them during booms. They enact countercyclical policy without the lags 
associated with legislative policy changes [article on http://www.investopedia.com]. They 
include income taxes and transfer payments.
 Income taxes largely depend on the level of aggregate production and income. If 
production and income rise, tax collections also rise. Income taxes also tend to be progressive, 
i.e. the proportion of taxes paid increases with income. This means that tax revenue is higher 
in an economic boom and lower in a recession, not only in absolute terms, but also as a 
proportion of national income [automatic stabilizers, article on http://www.amosweb.com]. 
Forms of tax that act like automatic stabilizers are: (i) Taxes on corporate profits - go up 
substantially   during   boom   times,   and   decline   rapidly   during   times   of   recession;   (ii) 
Progressive income taxes  - push people into higher income tax brackets during booms, 
substantially increasing their tax bill and reducing government budget deficits (or increasing 
government surpluses). During recessions, many individuals fall into lower tax brackets or 
have no income tax liability. This increases the size of the government budget deficit (or 
reduces the surplus). Other forms of tax do not exhibit these effects, because they are roughly 
proportionate to income (e.g. value added tax), or they bear no relation to income (e.g. 
property tax) [article on http://www.investopedia.com].
 Transfer   Payments,   including   social   security   to   the   elderly,   unemployment 
compensation to the unemployed, and welfare to the poor, depend on the level of aggregate 
production and income. They work opposite to taxes: if aggregate income rises, transfer 
payments tend to fall, as people are less likely to retire, be unemployed, or fall into the ranks 
of the poor. Discretionary Fiscal Policy is a policy action consisting of changes in a fiscal program 
initiated by the government in order to change aggregate demand, providing an alternative 
way to stimulate the economy when aggregate demand and interest rates are low and when 
prices are falling or may soon be falling [Feldstein (2002)]. Discretionary fiscal policy is 
made more difficult due to lags in recognizing the need for changed fiscal policy and the lags 
that occur with enacting the changed fiscal policy. There usually is a lag between the time that 
changes   of   fiscal   policy   are   needed   and   the   time   that   the   need   to   act   is   widely 
recognized. Additionally, a time lag may be between the moment of recognition and the 
moment that fiscal policy changes are actually enacted. Lastly, the impact of a change in 
fiscal policy may not be felt until six to twelve months after the change has occurred. For 
example, an expansionary fiscal policy (see Box 1) may be enacted when the economy is 
already recovering from a recession [article on http://www.investopedia.com]. These are 
accompanied by the lack of accurate forecasts.
Box 1. Expansionary fiscal policy
An expansionary fiscal policy (government spending higher than tax revenue) is a 
stance of fiscal policy that involves a net increase in government spending, through a rise in 
government spending or a fall in taxation revenue or a combination of the two, being 
associated with a budget deficit [article on http://en.wikipedia.org]. This leads to a larger 
budget deficit or a smaller budget surplus than the government previously had, or a deficit if 
the government previously had a balanced budget. According to Weil (2008), in a recession, 
the government can run an expansionary fiscal policy, thus helping to restore output to its 
normal level and to put unemployed workers back to work. Often, the focus is not on the level 
of the deficit, but on the change in the deficit. A contractionary fiscal policy (government 
spending higher lower than tax revenue) occurs when net government spending is reduced 
through either higher taxation revenue or reduced government spending or a combination of 
the two, being associated with a surplus [article on http://en.wikipedia.org]. 
In practice, discretionary fiscal measures are typically slower to arrive than both 
automatic stabilizers and monetary policy responses. Moreover, fiscal measures often become 
permanent, implying that public debt moves upward. According to Scott (2008), one of the first 
questions that policymakers need to address is “whether discretionary fiscal policy can be 
delivered on time and delivered well”. 
He concludes that, in the past, it has usually 
proven a challenge to meet these criteria: 
discretionary fiscal policy has usually been 
used less frequently than monetary policy 
during downturns, and it has taken longer to 
arrive, often after it is needed. Scott also 
notes that the response of discretionary fiscal 
policy is typically weaker than the stimulus 
provided by automatic stabilizers (Figure 1). 
Figure   1.  Responses   to   business   cycle 
changes 
Source:  Scott. 2008.   “Policy Responses to 
Slowdowns: Making Fiscal Stimulus Effective 
during Downturns”, IMF Survey Magazine. 
Considering the differences between advanced and emerging economies, an IMF survey 
(2008) finds that in advanced economies, discretionary fiscal policy has typically been 
countercyclical, that is taxes have been cut and spending increased during downturns. In 
emerging economies, discretionary fiscal policy has been procyclical that is stimulus has been 
added during good times and removed during downturns. This suggests that governments could try to enhance the scope and effectiveness of automatic stabilizers. In a report 
concerning   economic   crises   in   Europe   (2009),   the   European   Commission   notes   that 
government investment yields a somewhat larger GDP multiplier than purchases of goods and 
services. An increase in government transfers has a smaller multiplier, as it goes along with 
negative labour supply incentives. According European Commission's findings, temporary 
reductions in value added and labour taxes show smaller multipliers. Tighter credit constraints 
tend to increase the multiplier of these measures. A temporary reduction in consumption taxes 
is more effective than a reduction in labour taxes; it is attractive from a credibility point of 
view, since the private sector is likely to believe in a reversal of a temporary tax cut more than 
into a reversing of a temporary spending increase. Permanent reductions in VAT or labour 
taxes could yield short-run effects exceeding those of a permanent expenditure increase, 
because they reduce distortions imposed by the tax system [European Commission (2009)].
Fiscal Policy during the current financial and economic crisis
Economic growth is one of the main aims of macroeconomists and the government, as it 
allows a movement towards a better standard of living for the population. A recession is 
negative growth of GDP causing a downswing in the economies' business cycle. This is a 
direct threat to the primary aims of a government and so is high on its agenda of policies, 
tackling it being a necessity [article on http://www.buythemap.com]. If the economy is in 
recession then a government's priority will be to stimulate growth, by creating more 
employment and increasing aggregate demand. Keynesian economics suggests that adjusting 
government spending and tax rates are the best ways to stimulate aggregate demand. This can 
be used in times of recession or low economic activity as an essential tool in providing the 
framework for strong economic growth and working toward full employment. In theory, these 
deficits would be paid for by an expanded economy during the boom that would follow 
[article on http://en.wikipedia.org]. Keynes opponents aver that taxes may be a necessary 
“evil” to finance government operations and public services, but they distort incentives, 
reduce investment and labour supply and dampen growth. As for short-term stabilisation, 
discretionary fiscal spending is too susceptible to political interference. Better to rely on 
automatic stabilisers that are beyond the reach of politicians' personal interests and to use 
interest rates and the money supply to influence prices or unemployment levels [Dayton-
Johnson   (2008)].   Therefore,   in   a   deep   crisis,   automatic   stabilisers   may   need   to   be 
strengthened [European Commission (2009)].
In theory, fiscal policy is effective. However, there are practical problems that would 
affect policy making in a recession. We point out the most important ones:
 Higher government spending can lead to higher interest rates due to all the borrowing 
that is going on which would cause a discouragement in private sector investment. 
 When tax is lowered, although consumers have more money to spend, they will save 
more due to the fear of unemployment; increasing the amount of jobs does not create this 
attitude, and so more is spent. 
 The scale and logistics can make it inflexible and hard to implement, as a lot of 
government spending is contractual and cannot be simply stopped and started easily.  
Accordingly, the case for using discretionary fiscal policy to stabilize business cycles is 
further weakened by the fact that another tool, monetary policy, is far more agile than fiscal 
policy [Weil (2008)]. As an alternative, monetary policy controls the supply of money and 
inflation, and it can be manipulated day to day. However, as a recession puts the government 
in a difficult position, both fiscal and monetary policy has to struggle to combat the effects of 
a downturn in economic growth. Fiscal policy is only one way of controlling the economy, if 
it is used in the correct way and, along with monetary policy, it can be an effective way of 
keeping growth buoyant [article on http://www.buythemap.com]. In the current financial crisis, governments around the world must formulate and 
implement policies for taxation and public spending. Due to their major impacts on economic 
growth, income distribution, and poverty, nowadays they tend to be at the centre of economic 
and political debates [The World Bank (2007)]. The same opinion is expressed by Dayton-
Johnson (2008) who emphasize that one of the unexpected by-products of the current global 
financial crisis is that “it has placed fiscal policy back at the centre of the public policy 
debate”. Fiscal systems can provide the resources needed to carry out pro-growth investments 
and structural transformations, which in developing and emerging economies are so essential 
for long-term growth. Moreover, taxes and public spending can directly attack poverty and 
inequality, twin problems that continue to beset the region [Dayton-Johnson (2008)]. Terrones 
et al (2009) also emphasize that, during recessions associated with financial crises, fiscal 
policy tends to have a more significant impact, being more effective when economic agents 
face tighter liquidity constraints.
As a response to the financial crisis, monetary policy has been radically eased, in terms 
of significant interest rate reductions [Andersen (2009)]. Olivier Blanchard, IMF Economic 
Counselor, and Carlo Cottarelli, Director of the Fiscal Affairs Department within IMF 
[interviewed by Andersen (2008)] expressed the opinion that in the current financial context, 
the room for further monetary easing is shrinking, as in some countries policy interest rates 
are approaching zero. The same opinion has Andersen (2009), according to whom interest 
rates have been reduced to low levels, implying that the room for further interest rate 
reductions is small. Accordingly, it is a widespread perception that monetary policy cannot 
deliver sufficient stabilization in the present situation [Andersen (2009)], an opinion that is 
constantly brought forth since the collapse of Lehman Brothers [Belke (2009)].
Corsetti and Muller (2008) underline the necessity of the financing mix (taxes vs. future 
spending cuts), as well as coordinated cross-border fiscal expansionary policy. The opinion of 
a common and coordinated fiscal policy implementation is not commonly shared. For 
example, Belke (2009) suggests that it might be better to have independent national fiscal 
policies that are not coordinated or not correlated under Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), based on several arguments: (i) fiscal policy can be a source of shocks in the context 
of the current crisis; (ii) policy makers do not have full control over the outcome, therefore 
the effect of a certain measure is quite different from what is anticipated; and (iii) the 
economic forecasts underlying fiscal policy might turn out to be wrong. 
Many researchers have the opinion that the global financial crisis is now turning into a 
worldwide economic crisis [Andersen (2009)]. This opinion is argued by the continuously 
revised downwards of business cycle forecasts. Negative growth rates are expected for many 
OECD countries for 2009. More specifically, overall deficits are projected to increase by 5.5 
percentage points of GDP in 2009 and 2010, with respect to both 2007 pre-crisis levels and 
excluding losses from financial sector support. In advanced G20 economies, fiscal deficits in 
2009-2010 are now estimated to be larger, in some cases reflecting weaker growth prospects 
in 2009 before a stronger recovery in 2010. By contrast, changes in fiscal balances are now 
expected to be smaller in other G20 countries, particularly those where commodity revenues 
are important, according to Horton et al (2009). Growth rates are expected to recover only 
sluggishly, and, consequently, unemployment rates are soaring in all OECD countries 
[Andersen (2009)]. 
In the Spring Forecast for 2009 issued by European Commission, several factors are 
mentioned for the sharp increase in the projected general government deficits: (i) the 
economic downturn is bringing about declining tax revenue and rising social security 
expenditure, notably unemployment benefits; (ii) exceptional revenue windfalls witnessed in 
the recent boom period are continuing to reverse, which is reflected in a relatively strong 
erosion of some tax bases; and (iii) in line with the Commission's  European Economic Recovery Plan (see Box 2) many Member States have adopted significant discretionary fiscal 
stimulus packages to promote investment and sustain demand in general. 
According to the EERP, actions should aim  protecting employment  and  promoting 
entrepreneurship and they have to be done in the four priority areas of the Lisbon Strategy: 
people, business, infrastructure and energy, research and innovation. 
a) People: the top priority must be to protect Europe's citizens from the worst effects 
of the current crisis. 
1. Launch a major European initiative on employment support by (i) rapidly reinforcing 
activation schemes, and (ii) improving the monitoring and matching of skills development 
and upgrading with existing and anticipated job vacancies, in close cooperation with social 
partners, public employment services and universities;
2. Create demand for labour through (i) reducing employers' social charges on lower 
incomes to promote the employability of lower skilled workers, and (ii) adopting the proposed 
directive to make permanent reduced VAT rates for labour-intensive services. 
b)  Business:  sufficient and affordable access to finance as a pre-condition for 
investment, growth and job creation by the private sector. In order to reduce administrative 
burdens on business, promote their cash flow and help more people to become entrepreneurs, 
the Member States should: 
 Ensure that starting-up a business anywhere in the EU can be done within three days 
at zero costs and that formalities for the hiring of the first employee can be fulfilled via a 
single access point; 
 Remove the requirement on micro-enterprises to prepare annual accounts and limit the 
capital requirements of the European private company to one euro; 
 Ensure that public authorities pay invoices, including to SMEs, for supplies and 
services within one month to ease liquidity constraints and accept e-invoicing as equivalent to 
paper invoicing; 
 Reduce by up to 75% the fees for patent applications and maintenance and halve the 
costs for an EU trademark. 
Box 2. European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP)
The European Commission presented at the end of November 2008, the  European 
Economic Recovery Plan, proposing a coordinated stimulus package to be implemented by 
the Member States taking into account their particular conditions. EERP has one fundamental 
principle, which is solidarity and social justice - in times of hardship, action must be geared 
to help those most in need. In addition, the Plan has two key pillars:
· A major injection of purchasing power into the economy, to boost demand and 
stimulate confidence: Member States and the EU agreed to an immediate budgetary impulse 
amounting to € 200 billion (1.5% of GDP), to boost demand in full respect of the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP) (see Box 3).
· A direct short-term action to reinforce Europe's competitiveness in the long term, 
aiming   the   area   of   “smart”   investments   (e.g.   energy   efficiency,   clean   technologies, 
infrastructure) [Commission of the European Communities (2008)]
Box 3. Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
The Stability and Growth Pact pertains to the third stage of EMU, which began on 1 
January 1999, in order to ensure that the Member States maintain budgetary discipline after 
the single currency has been introduced. SGP is a rule-based framework for the coordination 
of national fiscal policies, established to safeguard sound public finances. It consists of a 
preventive and a dissuasive arm. Regarding the preventive arm, Member States have to 
submit annual stability programmes, showing how they intend to achieve or safeguard sound fiscal positions in the medium term, taking into account the impending budgetary impact of 
population aging. The  dissuasive part  governs the excessive deficit procedure that is 
triggered by the deficit breaching the 3% of GDP threshold of the Treaty of Maastricht on 
European Union [http://ec.europa.eu].
Following the Commission's guidelines in the EERP, the fiscal stimulus should be well 
defined and be based on the following principles: (i) it should be timely, temporary, targeted 
and coordinated at the European level; (ii) it should mix revenue and expenditure instruments; 
(iii) it should be conducted within the Stability and Growth Pact; and (iv) it should be 
accompanied by structural reforms that support demand and promote resilience.  These 
principles are particularly relevant given that, at the current juncture, markets tend to react 
rapidly to concerns related to public finance sustainability with an increase in the risk 
premium on public debt instruments, even in the euro area context [Banco de Portugal 
(2009)]. The role of fiscal stimulus, explained by Blanchard [Andersen, Camilla (2008)] is to 
limit the decline in demand as well as output. If no fiscal stimulus is implemented, then 
demand may continue to fall and “vicious cycles” may appear, like as deflation and liquidity 
traps, expectations becoming more and more pessimistic and, as a result, a deeper and deeper 
recession. 
Government support can take various forms, with different implications for gross and 
net debt. These are summarized below, according to Spilimbergo et al (2009).
Public spending on goods and services – theoretically has a direct demand effect than 
transfers or tax cuts. Practically, the appropriate increase in public spending is constrained by 
the need to avoid waste. First, governments should make sure that existing programs are not 
cut for lack of resources. Governments facing balanced budget rules may be forced to suspend 
various spending programs (or to raise revenue). Second, spending programs that were 
delayed, interrupted or rejected for lack of funding or macroeconomic considerations, can be 
(re)started quickly. A temporary increase in public sector employment associated with some 
of new programs and policies may be needed.
Fiscal stimulus aimed at consumers need to take into account the present exceptional 
conditions, specifically: (i) decreases in wealth; (ii) tighter credit constraints, and (iii) high 
uncertainty.  The degree of pass-through to consumers is uncertain, its unwinding can 
contribute to a further downturn, and it is questionable whether decreases of just a few 
percentage points are salient enough to lead consumers to shift the timing of their purchases. 
Possibly larger, but more focused incentives, cash transfers for purchases of specific goods 
may attract more attention from consumers and have larger effects on demand.
Fiscal stimulus aimed at firms  has as a main objective ensuring that firms do not 
reduce current operations for lack of financing. While this is primarily the job of monetary 
policy, there is also some scope for governments to support firms that could survive 
restructuring, but find it difficult to receive the necessary financing from dysfunctional credit 
markets. 
Considering the recommendations of European Commission, it is necessary to answer 
two important questions: “What is the appropriate fiscal policy in the short term and what 
does this imply for the fiscal outlook?” and “What are the key elements of a fiscal strategy to 
ensure fiscal solvency?” [Cottarelli (2009)]. Answering the first question, Spilimbergo et al 
(2008) highlight that, under the circumstances that the current crisis will last at least for 
several more quarters, the fiscal stimulus can rely more on spending measures, as they may 
have advantages over tax cuts or increases in transfers, which operate by raising the 
purchasing power of households and firms in the economy, given the highly uncertain 
response of the latter to an increase of their income in current circumstances. 
For ensuring fiscal solvency, two priorities have to be considered to ensure that short-
term crisis alleviation is aligned with long-run development: (i) strengthening the social safety in order to help the most vulnerable and those most affected by the crisis to cope; and (ii) 
spending increases should concentrate in areas such as infrastructure that are likely to 
contribute to growth in the long term [Kraay and Servén (2008)]. In addition, experience 
shows that lower direct fiscal costs and higher recovery rates were achieved in the past 
(taking into account the severity of the crisis) when the banking crisis resolution strategy was 
(i) implemented swiftly, and transparent and received broad political support; (ii) backed by 
strong public institutions and legal frameworks; (iii)  consistent in terms of fair and uniform 
treatment of market participants; and (iv) was part of a clear exit strategy, including 
restructuring of the banking sector [Schaechter (2009)].
Factors that matters in strengthening the reaction to fiscal stimulus 
Barrell et al (2009) identify two factors, which may matter for the transmission of fiscal 
policy impulses:
 Openness of a country, measured by import volumes as a share of GDP, plays an 
important role in evaluation of the effectiveness of fiscal policy. When a government pursues 
an expansionary fiscal policy, a one-to-one effect on output cannot be expected, as a part of 
the aggregate demand's growth will go to imports. The larger is the share of imports in a 
country's GDP the bigger is the leakage to the imports and the less effective is the fiscal 
package. 
 Liquidity   constraints  approximated   by   the   relationship   between   changes   in 
consumption and changes in real disposable incomes, evaluate the strength of the impact of 
fiscal policy on domestic demand. Liquidity or borrowing constrained consumers spend more 
of increase in their current incomes than those who are able to make optimal borrowing and 
spending plans over time. The greater the share of liquidity constrained agents the larger the 
effects of fiscal shocks.
When taking into account the size of the economies of Member States, the distribution 
of fiscal stimulus efforts is broadly in line with the distribution of their needs and with the 
distribution of their ability to implement fiscal stimulus, without running into severe problems 
with regard of their balance of payments or fiscal position. This conclusion, drawn by the 
European Commission (2009), is based on the assumption that the fiscal stimulus packages 
are indeed temporary and will be fully reversed at the appropriate time when the economy 
recovers. 
To maximise its impact, the budgetary stimulus should take account  the starting 
positions of each Member State. “Those that took advantage of the good times to achieve 
more sustainable public finance positions and improve their competitive positions have more 
room for manoeuvre now”, according to EERP. In countries with high pre-crisis ratios of 
public sector debt to GDP, lack of  fiscal space  (see Box 4) not only constraints the 
government's   ability   to   implement   countercyclical   policies,   but   also   undermines   the 
effectiveness of fiscal stimulus and the quality of fiscal performance [Baldacci et al (2009)]. 
In countries with high debt or lower per capita income, crises lasted almost one year longer. 
Schaechter (2009) appreciates that during the strong economic pre-crisis times EU Member 
States “did not sufficiently strengthen their state of public finances, often in contradiction 
with their medium-term plans”. 
Box 4. Fiscal space
Fiscal space is the room in a government's budget that allows it to provide resources 
for a desired purpose without jeopardizing the sustainability of its financial position or the 
stability of the economy. The composite indicator, developed in European Commission, is 
created   including:   (i)   the   general   government   gross   debt-to-GDP   ratio,   (ii)   potential 
government contingent liabilities to the financial sector, (iii) estimates of foreseeable revenue 
shortfalls in the medium run, (iv) the current account balance as an indicator of external 
imbalances, and (v) the share of nondiscretionary expenses as a proxy for the vulnerability of public expenses to meet short-run obligations [Schaechter (2009)]. The fiscal space is very 
different across Member States [European Commission (2009)].
Actions to alleviate the recession are involving fiscal costs no matter they are based on 
automatic stabilizers or discretionary fiscal stimulus. According to IMF (2009), some of these 
impacts will be short-lived and others will be longer lasting or even permanent. As things 
stand now, the fiscal costs of the financial and economic crisis are expected  to be 
considerable.   In   its   spring   2009   forecast,   the   European   Commission   projected   that 
government borrowing in the euro area would rise to 5.3% of GDP in 2009 and 6.5% in 2010. 
In the euro area, government debt ratio, which stood at 66% in 2007, is projected to rise to 
84% in 2010. Thirteen out of sixteen euro area governments are projected to breach the 3% of 
GDP deficit reference value of the revised SGP. Moreover, according to González-Páramo 
(2009), “all are at risk of doing so next year”. These figures reflect the impact on public 
finances of the contraction in economic activity. They also reflect the costs of discretionary 
fiscal stimulus measures adopted in many countries. It is worth to mention the IMF's 
conclusion that the automatic stabilizers' impact is increasing as the economic conditions are 
weakened [IMF (2009)].
Baldacci et al (2009) emphasize that the composition of fiscal expansions matters for 
crisis length. Stimulus packages that rely mostly on measures to support government 
consumption are more effective in shortening the crisis duration than those based on public 
investment. 10% increase in the share of public consumption in the budget, reduces the crisis 
length by three to four months. Many countries have announced fiscal stimulus plans. We 
summarize them, according to the IMF's Companion Paper (2009):
 Regarding the composition of fiscal stimulus package: (i) Expenditure measures: 
Almost 2/3 of the fiscal stimulus has been represented by expenditure measures with 
particular emphasis on increased spending for infrastructure. Fifteen of the G20 have 
announced plans to increase spending on infrastructure, largely on transportation networks 
(Canada, France, Germany, and Korea, among others), either in the form of direct central 
government spending, or through capital transfers to local authorities. According to Horton et 
al (2009), emerging G20 countries have announced somewhat larger stimulus packages for 
2009, on average, than advanced G20 countries. This reflects smaller automatic stabilizers 
and consequently greater need, as well as substantial fiscal space in key emerging market 
countries. China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa have introduced large packages. 
Emerging market discretionary measures are also more heavily weighted to infrastructure 
investment and less focused on income tax cuts (Figure 2). (ii) Revenue measures: Nine G20 
countries have announced sizable cuts in personal income taxes (Brazil, Canada, France, 
Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Spain, the UK, and the US); while in six, indirect tax cuts have 
been announced. Cuts in the corporate income tax (CIT) have also been frequent but not as 
large; these include outright reduction  in the CIT rate (Canada,  Korea, and Russia), 
investment   incentives   (France  and   Korea),   or  more   favourable   depreciation   schedules 
(Germany, Russia, and the US).Figure 2. Group of 20 (G20) economies: Fiscal stimulus by category in 2009
Source: Horton et al. 2009. “The State of Public Finances: A Cross-Country Fiscal 
Monitor”, IMF Staff Position Note SPN/09/21, pp. 5
 Regarding the aim of fiscal stimulus package: Many countries have announced 
plans to protect vulnerable groups, including by strengthening  unemployment benefits 
(Russia, the UK, and the US), cash transfers to the poor (Korea) or support to children 
(Australia, Germany) or pensioners (Australia, Canada). A few G20 countries are also 
stepping up support for small and medium enterprises (e.g., Korea) and strategic or vulnerable 
sectors, such as construction (in Germany, for energy efficient buildings and repairs and 
renovations), defence and agriculture (Russia). Finally, a few countries are using stimulus 
measures to address longer-term policy challenges, such as improving the quality of health 
and education (Australia and China) or introducing incentives for environmentally-friendly 
technologies (China, Germany, and the UK). Revenue measures have targeted primarily 
households, through cuts in personal income and indirect taxes. 
Reviewing the supportive fiscal policies, IMF shows that the fiscal expansion is greater 
in advanced economies, reflecting the larger size of their governments and the greater role of 
automatic stabilizers such as income taxes and transfers (welfare payments, unemployment 
benefits) [IMF WEO (2009)]. For the G20 economies, crisis-related discretionary measures 
are estimated at about 2% of GDP for 2009 and 1.5% of GDP for 2010, both relative to 2007 
baselines. The categories of stimulus that were implemented most rapidly - tax breaks and 
transfer payments - are those that typically have lower effects on activity. Stimulus measures 
that have higher multipliers will likely be implemented at an accelerated pace during the 
second half of 2009, reflecting the lags inherent in new and expanded government spending 
programs, particularly in infrastructure. Estimates for 2010 reflect the phased implementation 
of stimulus spending initiated during 2009 and a carryover of tax provisions as well as the 
continued operation of automatic stabilizers.
Fiscal policy in Romania during the current crisis
According to  the  European Commission's Spring Forecast 2009, in the first three 
quarters of 2008, domestic demand for both consumption and investment boomed, fuelled by 
strong wage increases and a rapid expansion of credit. However, it proved that the ones less 
optimistic concerning the impact of the financial turmoil in the US and advanced Europe 
were, unfortunately, right. The effects of the turmoil have arrived in Romania with a lag, and 
the real and financial consequences are such that Romania faces a very sharp and disruptive 
economic slowdown. The largely foreign financed domestic demand boom and overheating 
pressures came to a sudden end at the beginning of the fourth quarter of 2008, following the 
significant tightening of international capital inflows, increased investor risk aversion to home-grown vulnerabilities and decelerating disposable income. Hence, domestic demand 
contracted by almost 2% y-o-y (year-over-year) in the fourth quarter, compared with an 
average increase of 14½% y-o-y in the first three quarters [European Commission, Spring 
Forecast (2009)]. 
In 2008, the budget deficit surpassed the maximum threshold of 3% of the GDP set by 
the Stability and Growth Pact, being of 5.4% of GDP (ESA methodology). This was mainly 
due to substantially higher-than-planned current spending, notably in public wages and social 
transfers. In addition, overly optimistic revenue projections did not materialise and a sudden 
drop in revenue collection in the last two months of the year owing to the economic 
slowdown added to the worse-than-expected outcome. 
These lead us to the conclusion that managing an economic boom has proved difficult: 
macroeconomic imbalances have widened - due to a persistent excess of consumption and 
investment over disposable income - and relatively high inflation has came up. Fiscal policy 
has contributed to the imbalances by more than spending revenues from higher growth (which 
led to larger fiscal deficits). Unfortunately, Romania has missed the opportunity to create 
buffers under the continued-boom scenario as a protection against a possible sharp slowdown 
[Fernández-Ansola and Jaeger (2008)]. In our opinion, higher revenues from the continued 
economic boom should have been saved to create room for a fiscal expansion in case that 
inflows and the economy slow down significantly. A sharp-slowdown scenario has put strong 
pressure on the fiscal position, in the context that this was already weakened by inconsistency, 
due to a large number of taxes and their frequent changes, resulting in an increased fiscal 
pressure on business environment. 
The 2009 budget adopted in February 2009, contained several measures to lower the 
deficit, including a recruitment freeze and the reduction of various bonuses in the public 
sector, cuts in expenditure for goods and services and subsidies, limiting pension increases to 
inflation, a 3.3 percentage points rise in the pension contribution rate and a bringing forward 
of the schedule to increase excise taxes. On the revenue side, measures aimed at eliminating 
certain tax deductions and allowances (in particular on company cars and depreciation of 
revaluated assets). On the other hand, the government planed a substantial increase in public 
investment in 2009 compared with 2008. These measures were reflected in a budget 
rectification approved by the government in April 2009  [European Commission, Spring 
Forecast (2009)]. 
The   Business   Monitor   International's   regional   report   on   political   risk   and 
macroeconomic prospects, issued in October 2009, argues that the data for Romania showed 
the economic downturn deepening during the second quarter 2009. According to the National 
Statistical Institute (NSI), the Romanian economy shrank by 8.8% y-o-y during the second 
quarter 2009, surpassing the 6.2% decline of the previous quarter, which indicates that 
economic conditions in Romania have deteriorated comparing to the first quarter. This 
translates into a poor outlook for tax collection as corporate and household earnings continued 
to suffer. This is especially pertinent given that unemployment is typically a lagging indicator 
of the business cycle, with VAT receipts and income tax collection likely to deteriorate even 
when the economy embarks on recovery. In addition, any expenditure cuts proved unpopular 
among the electorate, making it increasingly difficult for the government to satisfy the IMF's 
loan conditions.
Though the IMF has raised Romania's budget deficit target in 2009 to 7.3% of GDP 
(from a previous 4.6%), the government is still struggling to stabilise the fiscal account. 
Finance Minister Gheorghe Pogea announced in August that the government would slash 
RON5.5bn from public expenditures in 2009. Initiatives include sending public sector 
workers   on   unpaid   holiday   for   10   days   (contrary   to   the   European   Commission's 
recommendations), eliminating overtime pay, as well as reducing spending on goods and services. While tightening fiscal policy has sustained foreign investor risk sentiment, the risks 
to political stability has raised as unemployment increased and real incomes fall alongside the 
reduction in public sector pay. There is still likely that the required deficit target to be 
exceeded. The Business Monitor International's regional report issued in November 2009 
forecasts a shortfall equivalent to 8.0% of GDP in 2009. The planned reduction in public 
expenditures is likely to prove insufficient to contain the gaping fiscal shortfall, given the 
extent to which Romania's economic downturn is unfolding. 
Under these circumstances, according to the CESifo World Economic Survey published 
in August 2009, the assessment of the volume and structure of Romanian policy measures to 
fight financial and economic crisis was 1.3 (WES scale: 9 – fully sufficient; 5 – more or less 
sufficient; 1 – not sufficient) [Stangl and Nerb (2009)].
Regarding the fiscal measures, our opinion is that they put more pressure on people and 
business, contrary to the recommendation of European Commission to “protect employment 
and promote entrepreneurship”. Few examples are presented below:
o introducing the flat-rate tax, which, instead of improving the tax collection, led to 
self-liquidation of small firms, increased unemployment, and reduced private initiative;
o large delays on VAT refund on behalf of public authorities, for exporting companies, 
which result in lake of liquidity;
o maintaining  the requirement to prepare the half-year financial statements for all 
companies; moreover, in some counties, fiscal authorities imposed that these statements to be 
audited by an accounting expert (which is not a legal-based requirement); this result in an 
increased cash burden for the SMEs;
o increasing the social charges, referring to the contribution to social security, which is 
higher with 1% for employees and 2.3% for companies;
o sending public sector workers on unpaid holiday for 10 days, which is completely 
against the European Commission's recommendation, contained in the EERP:  “the top 
priority must be to protect Europe's citizens from the worst effects of the financial crisis”. 
Therefore, in the current economic context, Romania's first priority should be to tackle 
macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances that pose risks to the sustainability of its medium to 
long-term growth path. In order to increase external competitiveness and to lower the current 
account deficit and inflation, Romania has to implement a medium-term fiscal framework 
[Ernst & Young (2009)], in order to ensure fiscal sustainability. It is also necessary to revise 
the composition of expenditure to increase the share of growth-enhancing spending by 
reducing and redirecting state aid to horizontal objectives and to keep wage developments in 
line with productivity growth. In the context of a coherent better regulation policy, the 
implementation of measures to substantially reduce administrative procedures and delays in 
obtaining   authorizations   has   to   be   done   urgently,   in   order   to   improve   the   business 
environment and reduce sources for corruption. These will help ensure the European 
Economic   Recovery   Plan   is   implemented   in   a   way   that   is   compliant   to   long   term 
sustainability as well as responds to the economic crisis. 
Conclusion
Crises can have long-term negative effects, damaging human and physical capital with 
negative implications for productivity and potential output growth. Therefore, early recovery 
from a crisis is important, to minimize output losses in the short term and enhance medium-
term growth prospects. We subscribe the opinion that this calls for timely, targeted and well-
designed fiscal responses during downturns. 
According to our findings, the impact of fiscal policy on demand depends on the size of 
fiscal multipliers, the credibility of the sustainability of fiscal stimulus, the uncertainty 
surrounding the current and future economic environment, and the intensity and effectiveness of international cooperation. Our conclusion is that fiscal responses may not be effective 
when initial fiscal conditions are poor and fiscal space is limited. High public debt levels and 
past macroeconomic instability limit the scope for countercyclical deficit expansions and 
hamper the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus measures as markets perceive the higher future 
fiscal risks entailed by larger deficits [Baldacci et al (2009)].
In Romania, the policy measures to fight financial and economic crisis ware assessed as 
“not sufficient”. We argue that fiscal measures taken so far are ineffective, resulting in 
increased tax burden for business and people, increased liquidity constraints, and lack of 
private initiative. Moreover, these measures are not compliant with the recommendations of 
European Commission and the EERP provisions. Our conclusion is that, on short-term, 
Romania   should   implement   a  consistent   fiscal   stimulus   package,   in   order   to   protect 
employment and promote entrepreneurship. On  medium-term, the fiscal policy objectives 
should be the implementation of a fiscal framework and an adequate taxation structure, 
aiming the tax collection improvement and preventing the tax evasion. These will reduce 
macroeconomic imbalances and ensure fiscal sustainability.   
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